28 mai 2013

Vanuatu va enfin disposer d’une licence dispensée en français

http://www.e-orientations.com/imgs/orientation-etudes-metier-emploi.gifL'archipel du Pacifique va enfin disposer d'une formation en français, pour ses habitants francophones. Un manque qui s'était fait cruellement ressentir jusqu'à présent…
Partenariat avec l'Université de Toulouse 1 Capitole

Pour arriver à ce résultat, le ministère de l’Education du Vanuatu a demandé, en 2011, à l’Ambassade de France et à l’AUF, de mener une enquête sur la possibilité d'ouvrir une filière universitaire francophone à Port-Vila, la capitale. L'enquête s'est montrée favorable à la création d'une licence généraliste en administration économique, qui vient d'être lancée. Ce diplôme sera une formation délocalisée de l’Université de Toulouse 1 Capitole. L’université toulousaine assurera notamment la partie pédagogique et la remise du diplôme, tandis que c'est le ministère de l'Education du Vanuatu qui financera la formation. Voir l'article entier...
http://www.e-orientations.com/imgs/orientation-etudes-metier-emploi.gif Beidh an oileánra Ciúin mbeadh deireadh le oideachas i bhFraincis dá chónaitheoirí Fraince ina labhraítear. Tá easpa a measadh sorely go dtí seo. Gcomhpháirtíocht le hOllscoil na Toulouse 1 Capitole. Níos mó...

Posté par pcassuto à 22:10 - - Permalien [#]


24 février 2013

Partenariat avec l’Université des Mascareignes à Maurice: L’Université de Limoges exporte son savoir-faire

Logo Universite de LimogesHélène Pauliat, Présidente de l’Université de Limoges et le Dr Rajesh Jeetah, Ministre de l’Enseignement Supérieur, de la Recherche, de la Science et de la Technologie de la République de Maurice, ont signé un accord de partenariat le 12 février à Limoges concernant la création d’une université francophone « l’Université des Mascareignes » (UdM) sur l’île Maurice.
Cet accord est une reconnaissance du savoir-faire de l’Université de Limoges puisque celle-ci a été choisie pour aider l’université mauricienne à mettre en place sa gouvernance, sa pédagogie et sa recherche suivant le système européen LMD (Licence Master Doctorat). Des relations historiques unissent depuis longtemps l’Université de Limoges et deux établissements d’enseignement mauriciens. Pour l’Université de Limoges, c’est un exemple très représentatif de la politique de partage et d’essaimage de ses diplômes, qui contribue à l’augmentation de son rayonnement et de son attractivité.
La république de Maurice compte déjà 3 universités anglophones et souhaite offrir aux étudiants mauriciens et plus largement de l’Océan Indien et du continent africain, la possibilité de suivre des études universitaires en français. L’Université des Mascareignes sera la première université francophone internationale sur ce territoire. Elle ouvrira à la rentrée 2013 avec trois facultés:
- Faculté d’Ingénierie et de Développement Durable (IDD)
- Faculté de Technologie de l’Information et de la Communication (TIC)
- Faculté d’Economie et Gestion (EG)
A son démarrage, l’université mauricienne délivrera 26 diplômes de niveau licence. Les étudiants qui passeront leurs examens avec succès auront un double diplôme délivré à la fois par l’Université des Mascareignes et l’Université de Limoges.
L’université accueillera 900 étudiants en 2013, l’objectif étant d’atteindre rapidement les 2000 étudiants et d’ouvrir de nouvelles facultés en lettres, droit, etc, afin de constituer une université pluridisciplinaire comme celle de Limoges.
L’Université de Limoges apportera donc un appui institutionnel à l’Université des Mascareignes:
- en formant à la gouvernance les futures instances dirigeantes de l’UdM (chefs de département, doyens de faculté, staff de l’université créé par le bill ou le board),
- en formant l’ensemble des acteurs (enseignants, administratifs, techniciens) pour le volet pédagogique
- en formant à la recherche les enseignants en poste et des jeunes chercheurs des universités mauriciennes anglophones.
Par ailleurs, pendant 5 ans, le Directeur Général de l’UdM (équivalent du président d’université) sera une personnalité issue de l’Université de Limoges. Le premier directeur sera Pierre Guillon, professeur de l’Université de Limoges, fondateur de l’institut XLIM, directeur scientifique à la Direction Générale de l’Armement, directeur scientifique du département ST2I du CNRS puis directeur par intérim de l’institut des sciences de l’ingénierie et des systèmes du CNRS.
Enfin, le Président de l’Université de Limoges ou son représentant, siégera au Board (équivalent du Conseil d’Administration) de l’UdM.
Consulter le dossier de presse.
Ollscoil Lógó Limoges Helen Pauliat, Uachtarán Ollscoil Limoges agus an Dr Rajesh Jeetah, an tAire Ard-Oideachas, Taighde ar Eolaíocht, Teicneolaíocht agus Phoblacht na Oileán Mhuirís, tá síníodh comhaontú comhpháirtíochta ar 12 Feabhra Limoges ar a chruthú francophone ollscoil "Ollscoil Mascarene" (UOM) i Oileán Mhuirís. Níos mó...

Posté par pcassuto à 09:32 - - Permalien [#]

Island to open first French language university

http://enews.ksu.edu.sa/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/UWN.jpgBy Guillaume Gouges. The Mauritian government has announced the opening this year of the Indian Ocean island’s first French language university, to be called Université des Mascareignes, with the help of France’s University of Limoges.
The French university's President Hélène Pauliat met Mauritian Minister of Tertiary Education Rajesh Jeetah earlier this month to sign a memorandum of understanding on the project.
Mauritius has positioned itself in recent years to be a regional knowledge hub. Higher education reforms are under way, new universities and campuses are being built and the government is working to attract 100,000 international students by 2020.
Université des Mascareignes will join a long list of private foreign tertiary institutions opening branches in Mauritius.
Some 66 overseas institutions and examination bodies are now operating locally, 36 of them from the UK, eight from France-Réunion, eight from India, five from Australia, four from South Africa, two each from Malaysia and the United States, and one from Sudan.
The management of the University of Limoges, said the ministry, will assist local authorities in setting up a French-based teaching and good governance system for the new institution. Read more...

Posté par pcassuto à 08:52 - - Permalien [#]

23 janvier 2013

New unit aims to boost education exports

Click here for THE homepageBy David Matthews. A new government unit will help universities expand abroad in an attempt to boost export earnings from the sector. Education UK has been launched by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and UK Trade & Investment, the government-run agency that aims to help British interests abroad. It will specifically target markets in India and the Middle East. Matthew Hancock, the skills minister, said that despite the UK's excellent reputation for education, the sector could make a bigger contribution to economic growth.
"It is essential that we realise the potential of the largely untapped resource that is our education exports. There is a fast-growing demand for high-quality education, and we are lucky to have a dynamic and entrepreneurial sector that is well placed to contribute," he said.
"We are in a global race and other countries are presenting attractive and coordinated offers, so Education UK is a vital step in bringing together the UK sector to drive its international engagement, particularly on high-value opportunities," Mr Hancock argued.
According to BIS, education exports are currently worth £14 billion to the UK, but this could rise to £21.5 billion by 2020. Read more...

Posté par pcassuto à 21:12 - - Permalien [#]

02 décembre 2012

Education as an export is worth billions

http://enews.ksu.edu.sa/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/UWN.jpgBy Geoff Maslen. Providing education to students from more than 100 nations around the world is Australia’s fourth largest export, behind iron, coal and gold but ahead of tourism, natural gas and crude oil, according to a new report.
The report says education as an export has played a key role in Australia’s economic prosperity, doubling in value every five years from 1990-2010. The sector overtook tourism as the top service export in 2007-08 and edged out gold, briefly, in 2009-10.
But the report notes that 2009 was the peak and that, since then, the income generated from the declining number of foreign fee-paying students – notably from India – fell from A$17.3 billion (US$18 billion) in 2009 to A$15.5 billion in 2010, and down to almost A$14.8 billion over the past year. Read more...

Posté par pcassuto à 10:04 - - Permalien [#]


07 novembre 2012

Exporting education - Canada has barely tapped world demand for higher learning

By Dezsö J. Horváth, Special to Financial Post. As global trade has increased, Canada’s share of exports and foreign direct investment has been slowly but steadily declining. Our country’s competitiveness in the global arena also continues to fall — we now rank 14th in the world, down from ninth in 2009, according to the World Economic Forum.
But Canada has a golden opportunity to make up lost ground by capitalizing on one area where we have the potential to be an economic powerhouse: higher education. The fact is, education is a knowledge-intensive export. It also happens to be a service we’re very good at providing: The best Canadian colleges and universities deliver education programs at a level that few other countries can match, available in both official languages. A number of our universities consistently rank among the best globally, as do a number of Canadian business schools and specialized programs in disciplines and fields ranging from aquaculture to computer animation. More...

Posté par pcassuto à 21:47 - - Permalien [#]

07 avril 2012

Exporting Education - why universities are expanding globally

http://eye.columbiaspectator.com/sites/default/themes/EyeSight/images/drop.pngBy Mark Hay. In mid-2006, the Emirate of Dubai broke ground on a new development located 12 miles outside of the city proper and cordoned off by a series of major roads. Dubai International Academic City, as developers dubbed the project, sought to establish a site in the emirate dedicated to the foundation and free operation of international university centers, branches, and satellites. Within less than six years, DIAC has grown from a few shovels in the ground to a massive complex of 27 universities, 26 of which are non-Emirati—six British, five American, and four Australian. In 2012, construction will cease at DIAC, already the center of study for 20,000 students from 137 nations (only a minority hail from Dubai). And by 2015, DIAC plans to accommodate 40,000 students while deepening and broadening its ties to international higher education.
But DIAC is not the only international academic hub in Dubai. Three years prior to DIAC, the emirate built Knowledge Village, which quickly reached capacity and necessitated rapid expansion. Projects of equal or greater scale are simultaneously under way in nearby Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Qatar. Singapore and Hong Kong are also proving to be hotbeds of international educational expansion.
Students at Columbia look to our Global Centers project and wonder at the enthusiasm with which we have erected seven centers—in Amman, Jordan; Beijing, China; Istanbul, Turkey; Mumbai, India; Nairobi, Kenya; Paris, France; and Santiago, Chile—from 2009 to the present day. (That’s not to mention a potential center in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and a scuttled center once intended for Kazakhstan.) Compared to our peers’ growth, however, Columbia’s has been mild. New York University famously opened a large “portal campus” in Abu Dhabi in 2010,but also operates 12 other centers (in Accra, Ghana; Berlin, Germany; Buenos Aires, Argentina; Florence, Italy; London, England; Madrid, Spain; Paris, France; Prague, Czech Republic; Shanghai, China; Sydney, Australia; Tel Aviv, Israel; and Washington, D.C.), and further expansion is planned for the future.
Columbia’s international expansion, and even the activities of host city Dubai, constitute just one placid chapter in a rapid churn of international higher education expansion by American, Australian, and British universities within the last 10 years. The expansion has been carried out suddenly and swiftly and has not yet been fully digested by academics, policy makers, or students. American universities explain the process through vague and mollifying rhetoric that relied on terms like “global citizenship” and images of utopian academic missions leading the charge toward a fully globalized, integrated world.
While there’s a strong flavor of truth to the rhetoric, international educational expansion is hardly the product of a benevolent global mindset. Yet neither is it a clever form of neocolonialism. Universities pursue this course out of a keen sense of business acumen and awareness of a changing educational economic landscape. They pursue it hotly, with little knowledge of how to go about it, flitting through starts and failures, taking large and small gambles on various forms of international campuses. But it is not irrationality that drives this mad rush. It is the knowledge, held by both universities and their host countries, that international education must flourish by some means, or else both partners face a future with few certainties. And those that do exist are grim.
A Brave Rhetoric for a Global Society

Despite the concentrated and far-reaching push for global education, one cannot easily tease out a single sound bite or causal link that sums up the phenomenon. Part of that fact is the result of an urge for differentiation among universities, with each branding its expansion efforts in separate terms. Michigan State University speaks of its expansion in terms of international centers, while NYU aims to create a cohesive “global network university,” and many British universities speak of branch campuses, satellite campuses, or other related but slightly different projects. With each name comes a slightly different rhetoric, spreading across a wide spectrum.
A reflection published at the end of 2010 by NYU President John Sexton best captures the rhetoric used to describe international educational expansion by American universities. The lengthy document mixes cultural critique, academic analysis, philosophical musing, and pragmatic reasoning into a colossal justification and explanation of NYU’s plans for rapid expansion.
In his opening, Sexton harks back to the Greek academy with references to Herodotus and the Nile, fitting the modern global expansion into a natural impetus of scholars and mankind to expand to new worlds and unravel the mysteries of the earth. He interprets universities as long-standing and latent transnational institutions, apt at bridging the gaps between worlds, although currently trapped and at least partly defined by the cities and cultures in which they reside. For Sexton, it thus becomes not just enjoyable and possible but logically necessary for universities to slip loose of their local bounds and take up their position as truly international institutions in an age of increasing globalization.
NYU Abu Dhabi spokesperson Josh Taylor echoes his president’s sentiments, claiming that “the architecture of the [Global] University incarnates in the free flow of its community, the free flow of ideas that has long characterized the academic disciplines and the advancement of thought.”
Columbia’s Vice President for the Office of Global Centers Kenneth Prewitt, describing our university’s distinct system, distances himself from the architecture, scale, and realization of NYU’s program. However, he still voices the same rhetoric in more staid terms. In one view, the University’s Global Centers are the natural and logical deepening and broadening of age-old partnerships between international institutions into more solid and perpetual relationships, linking a mutual but sporadic flow of information into a permanent and transnational link.
This talk of the natural academic pathway and impulse is firmly rooted in current realities. Alessia Lefebure, who teaches a class on Asian higher education policies and directs the Alliance Program, which links Columbia to top French universities, says universities recognize that training responsible citizens and leaders is part of their job. A big part of realizing that goal is the demand that students and academics engage with global issues and challenges. In increasing the size and mobility of the global elite and the chance that graduates will need global skill sets to engage in almost any college graduate occupations, globalization certainly directs the mission of the university.
Lefebure notes, however, that international expansion is not necessarily the most logical way to meet the need for global academic engagement. Universities could train faculty differently, teach differently, or develop stronger relationships with native institutions of education.
The focus on boots and bricks on the ground, on nameplates and foreign students receiving American degrees, does not arise as logically and naturally as Sexton might have one believe from the cognitive legacy of Herodotus. Universities choose global academic centers as a means of engaging with a new world and a new demand on higher education largely because they are a potentially smart and necessary business decision for universities operating in America, Australia, and Britain in the modern era.
The Win-Win Scenario

The age of global options and travel has measurably changed students in the Western world, according to Lefebure. Students want to travel and are increasingly choosing colleges based on their global reach. Not to mention the fact that nations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development region are hemorrhaging domestic students, especially graduate students. According to Spencer Witte, an associate with Ishtirak, a Middle Eastern and African business consultancy with ties to Gulf State international education projects, Western nations see it as imperative to attract pools of talented students to their domestic universities, to snap up academic markets in nations with little tradition of local higher education, and to build a presence and identity as an international university.
Philip Altbach, the director of Boston College’s Center for International Higher Education, simplifies the equation: Colleges choose to develop a physical presence abroad “to make money. That’s largely it.”
American, Australian, and British universities want to make sure that their enrollment numbers stay high and that they can continue to bring in students and tuition fees to help them expand and remain competitive with other institutions. Part of that competitive edge now involves making sure that one’s university has established global outposts and has a strong brand name around the world, attracting students, prestige, patronage, and wads of cash into the coffers of their institutions in the long run.
British universities embrace global expansion precisely for these reasons. According to Vanderbilt University Professor of International Education Policy Stephen Heyneman, local regulations and restrictions on tuition, enrollment, and other administrative matters within the nation’s borders drive British universities to take more risks and establish more aggressive presences in foreign nations to assure their continued economic viability, competitive brand, and top status by limited indicators.
Select foreign nations gladly embrace the profit- and security-seeking universities based in Anglo countries. “For each country there is a different reason,” Lefebure says. But “encouraging branches or other forms of presence is part of larger policies, not disconnected from the whole economic development of a city, country, region.”
Broadly speaking, cities like Singapore and those on the Chinese coast wish to move part of their economy to the knowledge sector by creating poles and cities that can become more attractive to economic investment. Attracting foreign universities allows for the development of local educated human capital, research and development, and attraction of families of high-skill individuals who will stay in and enrich the region. Foreign universities can develop faster and require less investment than the long process of developing local institutions and educational systems. Additionally, the matter of building a brand that businesses and students will trust is difficult, expensive, and time-consuming.
It is better and easier for places like Dubai to draw in Anglo universities, which have the cachet of high international rankings, recognizable names, well-established educational models, and strong support networks for local centers and which use a generally accepted academic language—English—that allows Dubai and similar cities to attract students from expat, diaspora, international, and local populations. The centers ultimately provide students and funds to American universities and reap returns for the host in innovators who remain in the country, attractiveness to diversifying businesses, and strong connections to the resources of American universities. Thomas Trebat, executive director of the Institute of Latin American Studies at Columbia and a party involved in the development of our Rio de Janeiro center, claims this latter incentive is a large motivator for local actors supporting the center’s development.
Lefebure stresses that global educational hubs are a point of converging interests in complex systems. If, for instance, Singapore wishes to become a global economic hub, it must also become a global educational hub. Like Hong Kong, Singapore has less interest in research and development and thus eschews importing all the bricks and mortar, but it still reaches out to Yale, among other prestigious universities, to draw upon its name, educational model, and partnership to create institutions carrying Yale’s DNA, periodically examined and approved by Yale. Singapore gains legitimacy, an attractive educational model, and a strong selling point for its city, while Yale gains a strong brand in Singapore. Yale builds relationships that pour immediate money into its coffers while guaranteeing a familiarity in Singapore with its name and model of education and thus encouraging graduates and later undergraduates to direct their energies and applications toward Yale as opposed to Harvard or MIT. And those students Singapore loses to graduate school and the diaspora, it replaces by attracting students from Southeast Asia at large into its academic system. Singapore and Yale realize that their interests converge, strike up a deal, and benefit mutually.
This system carries risks and limitations. Take South Korea, which, Altbach and Lefebure note, has been trying to attract international educational expansion because of its economic benefit. However, many young Koreans go abroad for higher education, and they have developed a strong taste for “the real thing,” Altbach says. This creates less of a demand for a local equivalent of Yale or Columbia. Likewise, because American schools already have a strong tie to the academic market of Korea, the investment of time and money, even with sweet financial incentives from Seoul, does not make sense to American universities. Even in places such as India or Pakistan where the market of students seeking international education is larger, the corruption, fractiousness, or bureaucratic structure of local government makes it harder to accommodate international universities. In general, Heyneman says, it pays best when universities open small campuses that promote high specialization.
Universities usually only step in when they see the possibility of high enrollment at low costs, with heavy subsidies from the local government. NYU received $50 million up front for its Abu Dhabi campus and turned down Dubai when it could not front the money, according to Witte. Still, Altbach and Heyneman stress that the uncertainty and governments’ conflicting interests in international campuses make failure a real possibility. Even small projects with low costs, if they fail, can stain the brand names of universities. Hence, Heyneman explains that universities with less recognized names are willing to take greater risks than previously well-established schools like Harvard, which is secure enough in the strength of its name to attract money.
The international arena is littered with failed models that ought to give pause to universities with much to lose. Ben Wildavsky, a scholar of education policy at the Kauffman Foundation and author of The Great Brain Race: How Global Universities are Reshaping the World, stresses that no university has ever successfully globalized. There is no road map, and as such, there is no predictor for success, even when interests align and the arrangement promises economic success. But the needs of universities drive them to create dozens of models of international engagement. “We’re going to see lots of experimentation,” Wildavsky says. “We’re letting a thousand flowers bloom,” waiting to see which one will prove stable and profitable.
Michigan State University and the Failure of Brick and Mortar

In 2007, just after the birth of DIAC, officials from Dubai approached Michigan State University with an early offer for involvement. It seemed like a good idea: MSU has a strong tradition of international engagement but virtually no partnerships or research in the greater Middle East. But when the board of trustees signed off on the deal, they had little reason to suspect that MSU’s Dubai campus would turn out to be an utter disappointment, a financial drain, and, largely, an overall failure within three years.
MSU Dubai was not the first international university facility to close down, nor the most devastating closure. The failure of George Mason University in the Persian Gulf and Johns Hopkins University in Singapore were more damaging to the brand names of their institutions and more financially dire failures. However, MSU Dubai’s failure drew attention mainly because the university had chosen to pursue an old-fashioned brick-and-mortar project in the Emirates. The failure of this archetypal form of international expansion played a major part in the disenchantment of the concept of a “satellite” campus.
“Satellite campus” is a confusing term that does not accurately capture the early models of foreign engagement. This term often conjures the image of a carbon copy American university transplanted with full facilities and programs into a foreign nation. In truth, MSU’s model was not a mirror image of its American counterpart. Its administration consisted of one full time faculty member, its student body reached around 400, and it offered less than a tenth of the majors available at their East Lansing campus. This early model sought to copy as much of MSU as it could in a Dubai context. Many who study the phenomenon refer to such establishments as “brick and mortar” centers.
“We made the decision that we were not going to devalue the quality of our brand by diluting academic expectations,” says Eric Freedman, Michigan State University’s associate dean of international studies and programs. They required applicants to fill out the same form as if they were applying to the East Lansing campus, meet the same academic requirements, and undergo the same modes of instruction. The campus hired few local instructors, favoring the option of periodically flying out MSU academics from America. The Dubai campus also set its price tag close to American tuition, which made it more expensive than other American education in the region, including schools with stronger brand names—MSU wound up with a student body less than one-fourth the size it expected and was funding majors no one was pursuing. These shortcomings, exacerbated by the financial collapse and the failure of private construction firms to provide promised infrastructure, led to the center’s closure in 2010.
Freedman now admits that the MSU Dubai center in DIAC was not a sustainable or attractive model. But MSU did not totally pull out of Dubai. When Freedman’s office was given control of MSU’s operations, its masters programs still remained in the city.
MSU dropped all pretenses of copying its academic standards and campus model in Dubai by 2011. It shifted from a brick-and-mortar structure to a network structure based in Knowledge Village with less infrastructure, allowing the fluid establishment of programs that proved they had local demand and could sustain themselves. These programs gained access to students while making sure not to encounter significant risk or feed financially off of the central university. Although these programs became narrower and the model less a carbon copy of MSU, the programs achieved success by working with the local dictates of Dubai and its students’ demands.
The Success of Flexible, Situational Models

While the story of MSU in Dubai may make the International Academic City seem like an inhospitable location to foster growth, in the hands of the right model it has proven to be an ideal hosting facility. In fact, the first facility to establish a presence at DIAC is Heriot-Watt University, a medium-sized Scottish institution based in Edinburgh. Its model has not only proved successful at DIAC, but has become one of the most successful examples of international expansion in the world.
Heriot-Watt shared MSU’s background as a school with a strong international profile, although its initial reasons for entering Dubai were more pressing. The vice-principal of Heriot-Watt, Andrew Walker, says that because Britain places caps on tuition and growth in the United Kingdom, international expansion is the best way for them to grow overall. They already worked with approximately 50 learning partners—universities allowed to use the Heriot-Watt name and model and monitored for quality—incorporating some 10,000 students.
Its facility, also at DIAC, cut down on costs and instruction barriers by employing its own academic staff and handling its own infrastructure while maintaining strong communication with the Edinburgh staff. While Heriot-Watt wanted to maintain its educational quality, it did adjust its admissions process, tuition, and educational model to fit Dubai. Heriot-Watt created a measured education targeted at a small group of local Emiratis, a larger community of expats, and large communities of foreign students from protectionist educational environments like India. The university attracted 2,700 students in total, effectively selling to other Muslims the ability to get a Western education that acknowledges and refers to Muslim traditions.
This flexible, site-specific programming that focuses on the interests of students and host governments while maintaining a baseline of quality and continuity, allowed Heriot-Watt to develop a low-impact presence. Walker acknowledges that these regional accommodations mean that the global campuses are not totally academically free, but as an interconnected network, they retain their holistic academic integrity. Heriot-Watt’s model accomplishes all that international education seeks to accomplish in terms of expanding student pools and brand names while avoiding any harm or potential cost to the university. This type of limited-engagement, targeted, interconnected campus that stresses the ability to pursue research without imposing on or angering host nations has proven wildly successful for Heriot-Watt.
Success in Dubai has led to nuanced emulations (and independent recreations) of this networked-centers model. NYU’s Abu Dhabi portal campus represents a similar goal of targeted and limited engagement. It is able to justify its $50 million in infrastructure costs because of its grant from the local government. It contributes positively to brand growth, student growth, depth of research, and interconnection with centers tailored to local consumers all over the world.
Name-Plate Networks

American universities, though, do not face the same pressures in most cases as Heriot-Watt. The desire for a competitive international presence and access to the research and academic talent pools still drive these universities, but the risks of even minimal physical campuses with degree-granting capabilities like the current MSU incarnation or Heriot-Watt can seem too high for players with comparatively less to gain and more to lose in terms of their brand’s value. The trend in America, Witte observes, is moving away from any remains of the brick-and-mortar model and toward low-risk, lower-impact, low-footprint centers, typified by Columbia’s Global Centers.
“Columbia centers have no infrastructure other than a name,” Heyneman says, summarizing the Global Centers model succinctly. Although this is a bit of an overstatement, Columbia has indeed focused more on name building, research facilitation, and the creation of a network than on the building of physical structures that grant degrees. The Global Centers have grafted themselves onto pre-existing locations where Columbia research was already well established. Urban planning projects in Mumbai and the Reid Hall programs in Paris were both used as foundations for Global Centers. The university merely raised $250,000 to $1 million per center, usually from local donors (in Santiago, local businessmen paid for almost the entire center, while Queen Rania Al Abdullah of Jordan heavily funded the center in Amman), to pay for minimal office space and administration to help strengthen local projects. “Very little of what the centers will do could not have been done without them,” Prewitt admits, “but maybe without the value added of a place to land in every world region,” which does ease and facilitate research.
Prewitt elaborates that Columbia’s idea is to establish a situation in which the university can strengthen its presence and that makes it easier to undertake research within different nations and in conjunction with foreign colleagues. This develops a network wherein limitations to the freedom of research in Amman will ideally lead to cooperation with Nairobi and Beijing to complete large-scale projects. Prewitt admits that the centers are a long way from that level of fluidity, but at the very least the centers allow Columbia to develop strong ties with local academic communities, giving access to education markets abroad.
A willingness to cooperate with local restrictions, as well as a low-impact model, allows Columbia to be involved in countries with less money to offset establishment costs or with more protectionist or hesitant governments. Columbia is embracing the open nature of its Global Centers, letting them develop as they may. As President Lee Bollinger once said, “Part of my whole theory here is, ‘Do not plan this—do not overplan this.’”
Columbia’s model represents the opposite impetus from MSU’s initial Dubai campus. Small and compact, appealing directly to brand growth and presence, the Global Centers can flourish almost anywhere. They are much less likely to be financially successful, but the damage if one fails and the risks tied to Columbia’s brand and position are much lower than even Heriot-Watt faces. It represents an increasingly favorable model for the economic concerns of big American universities.
What Campuses May Come

Everyone interviewed for this piece agrees that no one can know what the future holds for international educational expansion. Some believe we will know which models work best within five years, and others believe it will take 25. But, as Wildavsky stresses, the modern era is one of experimentation and risk taking. Universities will continue to develop new models of their own, differentiating themselves from their peers while reacting to the successes and failures they witness.
Thus far, Witte believes, universities have learned a few basic lessons from pre-existing models: Almost every model now focuses on thoroughly vetting potential partners. Anglo universities check to see if the nations they choose have the funds to facilitate their model, the leeway and freedoms to establish the brand the university desires, and the ability to attract the student population universities need. Whether in the form of Heriot-Watt-style networks or Columbia’s minimalist centers, the trend favors tailored and small institutions.
However, even this model remains uncertain. “I think this is a bit of a bubble,” Altbach says of the massive expansion of universities abroad. Someday that bubble may pop and destroy dozens of the hundreds of models acting and reacting abroad. Even then, if MSU’s failure is any indication, universities will simply rebound and reinvent their models. They have to, Witte says. Some just need to stay on top. For others, building a competitive brand and presence abroad is a matter of survival for the institution as a whole.

Posté par pcassuto à 21:38 - - Permalien [#]

06 avril 2012

Exporting Education why universities are expanding globally

http://eye.columbiaspectator.com/sites/default/themes/EyeSight/images/drop.pngBy Mark Hay. In mid-2006, the Emirate of Dubai broke ground on a new development located 12 miles outside of the city proper and cordoned off by a series of major roads. Dubai International Academic City, as developers dubbed the project, sought to establish a site in the emirate dedicated to the foundation and free operation of international university centers, branches, and satellites. Within less than six years, DIAC has grown from a few shovels in the ground to a massive complex of 27 universities, 26 of which are non-Emirati—six British, five American, and four Australian. In 2012, construction will cease at DIAC, already the center of study for 20,000 students from 137 nations (only a minority hail from Dubai). And by 2015, DIAC plans to accommodate 40,000 students while deepening and broadening its ties to international higher education.
But DIAC is not the only international academic hub in Dubai. Three years prior to DIAC, the emirate built Knowledge Village, which quickly reached capacity and necessitated rapid expansion. Projects of equal or greater scale are simultaneously under way in nearby Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Qatar. Singapore and Hong Kong are also proving to be hotbeds of international educational expansion.
Students at Columbia look to our Global Centers project and wonder at the enthusiasm with which we have erected seven centers—in Amman, Jordan; Beijing, China; Istanbul, Turkey; Mumbai, India; Nairobi, Kenya; Paris, France; and Santiago, Chile—from 2009 to the present day. (That’s not to mention a potential center in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and a scuttled center once intended for Kazakhstan.) Compared to our peers’ growth, however, Columbia’s has been mild. New York University famously opened a large “portal campus” in Abu Dhabi in 2010,but also operates 12 other centers (in Accra, Ghana; Berlin, Germany; Buenos Aires, Argentina; Florence, Italy; London, England; Madrid, Spain; Paris, France; Prague, Czech Republic; Shanghai, China; Sydney, Australia; Tel Aviv, Israel; and Washington, D.C.), and further expansion is planned for the future.
Columbia’s international expansion, and even the activities of host city Dubai, constitute just one placid chapter in a rapid churn of international higher education expansion by American, Australian, and British universities within the last 10 years. The expansion has been carried out suddenly and swiftly and has not yet been fully digested by academics, policy makers, or students. American universities explain the process through vague and mollifying rhetoric that relied on terms like “global citizenship” and images of utopian academic missions leading the charge toward a fully globalized, integrated world.
While there’s a strong flavor of truth to the rhetoric, international educational expansion is hardly the product of a benevolent global mindset. Yet neither is it a clever form of neocolonialism. Universities pursue this course out of a keen sense of business acumen and awareness of a changing educational economic landscape. They pursue it hotly, with little knowledge of how to go about it, flitting through starts and failures, taking large and small gambles on various forms of international campuses. But it is not irrationality that drives this mad rush. It is the knowledge, held by both universities and their host countries, that international education must flourish by some means, or else both partners face a future with few certainties. And those that do exist are grim.
A Brave Rhetoric for a Global Society

Despite the concentrated and far-reaching push for global education, one cannot easily tease out a single sound bite or causal link that sums up the phenomenon. Part of that fact is the result of an urge for differentiation among universities, with each branding its expansion efforts in separate terms. Michigan State University speaks of its expansion in terms of international centers, while NYU aims to create a cohesive “global network university,” and many British universities speak of branch campuses, satellite campuses, or other related but slightly different projects. With each name comes a slightly different rhetoric, spreading across a wide spectrum.
A reflection published at the end of 2010 by NYU President John Sexton best captures the rhetoric used to describe international educational expansion by American universities. The lengthy document mixes cultural critique, academic analysis, philosophical musing, and pragmatic reasoning into a colossal justification and explanation of NYU’s plans for rapid expansion.
In his opening, Sexton harks back to the Greek academy with references to Herodotus and the Nile, fitting the modern global expansion into a natural impetus of scholars and mankind to expand to new worlds and unravel the mysteries of the earth. He interprets universities as long-standing and latent transnational institutions, apt at bridging the gaps between worlds, although currently trapped and at least partly defined by the cities and cultures in which they reside. For Sexton, it thus becomes not just enjoyable and possible but logically necessary for universities to slip loose of their local bounds and take up their position as truly international institutions in an age of increasing globalization.
NYU Abu Dhabi spokesperson Josh Taylor echoes his president’s sentiments, claiming that “the architecture of the [Global] University incarnates in the free flow of its community, the free flow of ideas that has long characterized the academic disciplines and the advancement of thought.”
Columbia’s Vice President for the Office of Global Centers Kenneth Prewitt, describing our university’s distinct system, distances himself from the architecture, scale, and realization of NYU’s program. However, he still voices the same rhetoric in more staid terms. In one view, the University’s Global Centers are the natural and logical deepening and broadening of age-old partnerships between international institutions into more solid and perpetual relationships, linking a mutual but sporadic flow of information into a permanent and transnational link.
This talk of the natural academic pathway and impulse is firmly rooted in current realities. Alessia Lefebure, who teaches a class on Asian higher education policies and directs the Alliance Program, which links Columbia to top French universities, says universities recognize that training responsible citizens and leaders is part of their job. A big part of realizing that goal is the demand that students and academics engage with global issues and challenges. In increasing the size and mobility of the global elite and the chance that graduates will need global skill sets to engage in almost any college graduate occupations, globalization certainly directs the mission of the university.
Lefebure notes, however, that international expansion is not necessarily the most logical way to meet the need for global academic engagement. Universities could train faculty differently, teach differently, or develop stronger relationships with native institutions of education.
The focus on boots and bricks on the ground, on nameplates and foreign students receiving American degrees, does not arise as logically and naturally as Sexton might have one believe from the cognitive legacy of Herodotus. Universities choose global academic centers as a means of engaging with a new world and a new demand on higher education largely because they are a potentially smart and necessary business decision for universities operating in America, Australia, and Britain in the modern era.
The Win-Win Scenario

The age of global options and travel has measurably changed students in the Western world, according to Lefebure. Students want to travel and are increasingly choosing colleges based on their global reach. Not to mention the fact that nations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development region are hemorrhaging domestic students, especially graduate students. According to Spencer Witte, an associate with Ishtirak, a Middle Eastern and African business consultancy with ties to Gulf State international education projects, Western nations see it as imperative to attract pools of talented students to their domestic universities, to snap up academic markets in nations with little tradition of local higher education, and to build a presence and identity as an international university.
Philip Altbach, the director of Boston College’s Center for International Higher Education, simplifies the equation: Colleges choose to develop a physical presence abroad “to make money. That’s largely it.”
American, Australian, and British universities want to make sure that their enrollment numbers stay high and that they can continue to bring in students and tuition fees to help them expand and remain competitive with other institutions. Part of that competitive edge now involves making sure that one’s university has established global outposts and has a strong brand name around the world, attracting students, prestige, patronage, and wads of cash into the coffers of their institutions in the long run.
British universities embrace global expansion precisely for these reasons. According to Vanderbilt University Professor of International Education Policy Stephen Heyneman, local regulations and restrictions on tuition, enrollment, and other administrative matters within the nation’s borders drive British universities to take more risks and establish more aggressive presences in foreign nations to assure their continued economic viability, competitive brand, and top status by limited indicators.
Select foreign nations gladly embrace the profit- and security-seeking universities based in Anglo countries. “For each country there is a different reason,” Lefebure says. But “encouraging branches or other forms of presence is part of larger policies, not disconnected from the whole economic development of a city, country, region.”
Broadly speaking, cities like Singapore and those on the Chinese coast wish to move part of their economy to the knowledge sector by creating poles and cities that can become more attractive to economic investment. Attracting foreign universities allows for the development of local educated human capital, research and development, and attraction of families of high-skill individuals who will stay in and enrich the region. Foreign universities can develop faster and require less investment than the long process of developing local institutions and educational systems. Additionally, the matter of building a brand that businesses and students will trust is difficult, expensive, and time-consuming.
It is better and easier for places like Dubai to draw in Anglo universities, which have the cachet of high international rankings, recognizable names, well-established educational models, and strong support networks for local centers and which use a generally accepted academic language—English—that allows Dubai and similar cities to attract students from expat, diaspora, international, and local populations. The centers ultimately provide students and funds to American universities and reap returns for the host in innovators who remain in the country, attractiveness to diversifying businesses, and strong connections to the resources of American universities. Thomas Trebat, executive director of the Institute of Latin American Studies at Columbia and a party involved in the development of our Rio de Janeiro center, claims this latter incentive is a large motivator for local actors supporting the center’s development.
Lefebure stresses that global educational hubs are a point of converging interests in complex systems. If, for instance, Singapore wishes to become a global economic hub, it must also become a global educational hub. Like Hong Kong, Singapore has less interest in research and development and thus eschews importing all the bricks and mortar, but it still reaches out to Yale, among other prestigious universities, to draw upon its name, educational model, and partnership to create institutions carrying Yale’s DNA, periodically examined and approved by Yale. Singapore gains legitimacy, an attractive educational model, and a strong selling point for its city, while Yale gains a strong brand in Singapore. Yale builds relationships that pour immediate money into its coffers while guaranteeing a familiarity in Singapore with its name and model of education and thus encouraging graduates and later undergraduates to direct their energies and applications toward Yale as opposed to Harvard or MIT. And those students Singapore loses to graduate school and the diaspora, it replaces by attracting students from Southeast Asia at large into its academic system. Singapore and Yale realize that their interests converge, strike up a deal, and benefit mutually.
This system carries risks and limitations. Take South Korea, which, Altbach and Lefebure note, has been trying to attract international educational expansion because of its economic benefit. However, many young Koreans go abroad for higher education, and they have developed a strong taste for “the real thing,” Altbach says. This creates less of a demand for a local equivalent of Yale or Columbia. Likewise, because American schools already have a strong tie to the academic market of Korea, the investment of time and money, even with sweet financial incentives from Seoul, does not make sense to American universities. Even in places such as India or Pakistan where the market of students seeking international education is larger, the corruption, fractiousness, or bureaucratic structure of local government makes it harder to accommodate international universities. In general, Heyneman says, it pays best when universities open small campuses that promote high specialization.
Universities usually only step in when they see the possibility of high enrollment at low costs, with heavy subsidies from the local government. NYU received $50 million up front for its Abu Dhabi campus and turned down Dubai when it could not front the money, according to Witte. Still, Altbach and Heyneman stress that the uncertainty and governments’ conflicting interests in international campuses make failure a real possibility. Even small projects with low costs, if they fail, can stain the brand names of universities. Hence, Heyneman explains that universities with less recognized names are willing to take greater risks than previously well-established schools like Harvard, which is secure enough in the strength of its name to attract money.
The international arena is littered with failed models that ought to give pause to universities with much to lose. Ben Wildavsky, a scholar of education policy at the Kauffman Foundation and author of The Great Brain Race: How Global Universities are Reshaping the World, stresses that no university has ever successfully globalized. There is no road map, and as such, there is no predictor for success, even when interests align and the arrangement promises economic success. But the needs of universities drive them to create dozens of models of international engagement. “We’re going to see lots of experimentation,” Wildavsky says. “We’re letting a thousand flowers bloom,” waiting to see which one will prove stable and profitable.
Michigan State University and the Failure of Brick and Mortar

In 2007, just after the birth of DIAC, officials from Dubai approached Michigan State University with an early offer for involvement. It seemed like a good idea: MSU has a strong tradition of international engagement but virtually no partnerships or research in the greater Middle East. But when the board of trustees signed off on the deal, they had little reason to suspect that MSU’s Dubai campus would turn out to be an utter disappointment, a financial drain, and, largely, an overall failure within three years.
MSU Dubai was not the first international university facility to close down, nor the most devastating closure. The failure of George Mason University in the Persian Gulf and Johns Hopkins University in Singapore were more damaging to the brand names of their institutions and more financially dire failures. However, MSU Dubai’s failure drew attention mainly because the university had chosen to pursue an old-fashioned brick-and-mortar project in the Emirates. The failure of this archetypal form of international expansion played a major part in the disenchantment of the concept of a “satellite” campus.
“Satellite campus” is a confusing term that does not accurately capture the early models of foreign engagement. This term often conjures the image of a carbon copy American university transplanted with full facilities and programs into a foreign nation. In truth, MSU’s model was not a mirror image of its American counterpart. Its administration consisted of one full time faculty member, its student body reached around 400, and it offered less than a tenth of the majors available at their East Lansing campus. This early model sought to copy as much of MSU as it could in a Dubai context. Many who study the phenomenon refer to such establishments as “brick and mortar” centers.
“We made the decision that we were not going to devalue the quality of our brand by diluting academic expectations,” says Eric Freedman, Michigan State University’s associate dean of international studies and programs. They required applicants to fill out the same form as if they were applying to the East Lansing campus, meet the same academic requirements, and undergo the same modes of instruction. The campus hired few local instructors, favoring the option of periodically flying out MSU academics from America. The Dubai campus also set its price tag close to American tuition, which made it more expensive than other American education in the region, including schools with stronger brand names—MSU wound up with a student body less than one-fourth the size it expected and was funding majors no one was pursuing. These shortcomings, exacerbated by the financial collapse and the failure of private construction firms to provide promised infrastructure, led to the center’s closure in 2010.
Freedman now admits that the MSU Dubai center in DIAC was not a sustainable or attractive model. But MSU did not totally pull out of Dubai. When Freedman’s office was given control of MSU’s operations, its masters programs still remained in the city. MSU dropped all pretenses of copying its academic standards and campus model in Dubai by 2011. It shifted from a brick-and-mortar structure to a network structure based in Knowledge Village with less infrastructure, allowing the fluid establishment of programs that proved they had local demand and could sustain themselves. These programs gained access to students while making sure not to encounter significant risk or feed financially off of the central university. Although these programs became narrower and the model less a carbon copy of MSU, the programs achieved success by working with the local dictates of Dubai and its students’ demands.
The Success of Flexible, Situational Models

While the story of MSU in Dubai may make the International Academic City seem like an inhospitable location to foster growth, in the hands of the right model it has proven to be an ideal hosting facility. In fact, the first facility to establish a presence at DIAC is Heriot-Watt University, a medium-sized Scottish institution based in Edinburgh. Its model has not only proved successful at DIAC, but has become one of the most successful examples of international expansion in the world.
Heriot-Watt shared MSU’s background as a school with a strong international profile, although its initial reasons for entering Dubai were more pressing. The vice-principal of Heriot-Watt, Andrew Walker, says that because Britain places caps on tuition and growth in the United Kingdom, international expansion is the best way for them to grow overall. They already worked with approximately 50 learning partners—universities allowed to use the Heriot-Watt name and model and monitored for quality—incorporating some 10,000 students. Its facility, also at DIAC, cut down on costs and instruction barriers by employing its own academic staff and handling its own infrastructure while maintaining strong communication with the Edinburgh staff. While Heriot-Watt wanted to maintain its educational quality, it did adjust its admissions process, tuition, and educational model to fit Dubai. Heriot-Watt created a measured education targeted at a small group of local Emiratis, a larger community of expats, and large communities of foreign students from protectionist educational environments like India. The university attracted 2,700 students in total, effectively selling to other Muslims the ability to get a Western education that acknowledges and refers to Muslim traditions.
This flexible, site-specific programming that focuses on the interests of students and host governments while maintaining a baseline of quality and continuity, allowed Heriot-Watt to develop a low-impact presence. Walker acknowledges that these regional accommodations mean that the global campuses are not totally academically free, but as an interconnected network, they retain their holistic academic integrity. Heriot-Watt’s model accomplishes all that international education seeks to accomplish in terms of expanding student pools and brand names while avoiding any harm or potential cost to the university. This type of limited-engagement, targeted, interconnected campus that stresses the ability to pursue research without imposing on or angering host nations has proven wildly successful for Heriot-Watt.
Success in Dubai has led to nuanced emulations (and independent recreations) of this networked-centers model. NYU’s Abu Dhabi portal campus represents a similar goal of targeted and limited engagement. It is able to justify its $50 million in infrastructure costs because of its grant from the local government. It contributes positively to brand growth, student growth, depth of research, and interconnection with centers tailored to local consumers all over the world.
Name-Plate Networks

American universities, though, do not face the same pressures in most cases as Heriot-Watt. The desire for a competitive international presence and access to the research and academic talent pools still drive these universities, but the risks of even minimal physical campuses with degree-granting capabilities like the current MSU incarnation or Heriot-Watt can seem too high for players with comparatively less to gain and more to lose in terms of their brand’s value. The trend in America, Witte observes, is moving away from any remains of the brick-and-mortar model and toward low-risk, lower-impact, low-footprint centers, typified by Columbia’s Global Centers.
“Columbia centers have no infrastructure other than a name,” Heyneman says, summarizing the Global Centers model succinctly. Although this is a bit of an overstatement, Columbia has indeed focused more on name building, research facilitation, and the creation of a network than on the building of physical structures that grant degrees. The Global Centers have grafted themselves onto pre-existing locations where Columbia research was already well established. Urban planning projects in Mumbai and the Reid Hall programs in Paris were both used as foundations for Global Centers. The university merely raised $250,000 to $1 million per center, usually from local donors (in Santiago, local businessmen paid for almost the entire center, while Queen Rania Al Abdullah of Jordan heavily funded the center in Amman), to pay for minimal office space and administration to help strengthen local projects. “Very little of what the centers will do could not have been done without them,” Prewitt admits, “but maybe without the value added of a place to land in every world region,” which does ease and facilitate research.
Prewitt elaborates that Columbia’s idea is to establish a situation in which the university can strengthen its presence and that makes it easier to undertake research within different nations and in conjunction with foreign colleagues. This develops a network wherein limitations to the freedom of research in Amman will ideally lead to cooperation with Nairobi and Beijing to complete large-scale projects. Prewitt admits that the centers are a long way from that level of fluidity, but at the very least the centers allow Columbia to develop strong ties with local academic communities, giving access to education markets abroad. A willingness to cooperate with local restrictions, as well as a low-impact model, allows Columbia to be involved in countries with less money to offset establishment costs or with more protectionist or hesitant governments. Columbia is embracing the open nature of its Global Centers, letting them develop as they may. As President Lee Bollinger once said, “Part of my whole theory here is, ‘Do not plan this—do not overplan this.’
Columbia’s model represents the opposite impetus from MSU’s initial Dubai campus. Small and compact, appealing directly to brand growth and presence, the Global Centers can flourish almost anywhere. They are much less likely to be financially successful, but the damage if one fails and the risks tied to Columbia’s brand and position are much lower than even Heriot-Watt faces. It represents an increasingly favorable model for the economic concerns of big American universities.
What Campuses May Come

Everyone interviewed for this piece agrees that no one can know what the future holds for international educational expansion. Some believe we will know which models work best within five years, and others believe it will take 25. But, as Wildavsky stresses, the modern era is one of experimentation and risk taking. Universities will continue to develop new models of their own, differentiating themselves from their peers while reacting to the successes and failures they witness. Thus far, Witte believes, universities have learned a few basic lessons from pre-existing models: Almost every model now focuses on thoroughly vetting potential partners. Anglo universities check to see if the nations they choose have the funds to facilitate their model, the leeway and freedoms to establish the brand the university desires, and the ability to attract the student population universities need. Whether in the form of Heriot-Watt-style networks or Columbia’s minimalist centers, the trend favors tailored and small institutions.
However, even this model remains uncertain. “I think this is a bit of a bubble,” Altbach says of the massive expansion of universities abroad. Someday that bubble may pop and destroy dozens of the hundreds of models acting and reacting abroad. Even then, if MSU’s failure is any indication, universities will simply rebound and reinvent their models. They have to, Witte says. Some just need to stay on top. For others, building a competitive brand and presence abroad is a matter of survival for the institution as a whole.

Posté par pcassuto à 00:40 - - Permalien [#]

01 février 2012

OBHE report on international branch campuses

http://www.tolkenselect.nl/upload/Image/nuffic_Tolkenselect.PNGPosted by Marianne Cox. The Observatory on Borderless Higher Education (OBHE) recently published its fourth report on international branch campus (IBCs), one of the intriguing developments in internationalisation in higher education of recent years.
Report
The International Branch Campuses: data and developments report, is based on a vast amount of data and in the analysis a serious attempt is made to come to grips with these outposts of national institutions and their activities. The report provides a list of branch campuses in operation, courses, degrees, student numbers and fees. It also presents definitions and identifies trends and developments in this expanding development.
The report provides an interesting insight into 'the shift of activity to the Far East and inter-regional South-South IBCs' and highlights the effects of the involvement of governments when educational goals are integrated into economic strategic policies, something especially visible in IBC activity in Asia. Defining IBCs as such, however, is another matter.
A moving target

Even though the authors concede that there 'is no universally agreed definition of an international branch campus', the researchers base the report on the following definition of an international branch campus:
A higher education institution that is located in another country from the institution which either originated it or operates it, with some physical presence in the host country, and which awards at least one degree in the host country that is accredited in the country of the originating institution.
It is quite clear that the authors walked a careful and laborious track before agreeing on the definition. Various models and types of foreign institutions and programmes were investigated and a large part of the report is devoted to its defence. This course of consideration is of course laudable, yet the examples and the listings show how difficult it is to distinguish transnational education (TNE) and branch campus operations. As it appears to be equally difficult to apply the definition consistently in the course of the report. For instance, according to the definition only institutions (...) which award at least one degree in the host country that is accredited in the country of the originating institution are included in the listing of the IBCs. The partnership of Yale University with the National University of Singapore (NUS) is included, even though 'the degree will be awarded by the NUS alone'. According to the definition this would mean that the NUS degree is accredited in the US in line with a Yale degree. Is that true? Later on, more examples of joint Master degrees are mentioned which in some cases have, and in other cases have not been included because their operations are or are not, covered by the definition. It is a bit confusing. 
Of course definitions are indispensable in a well-argumented academic report, and I do not intend to address the issue whether a comprehensive definition for this multi-faced phenomenon is at all possible. It has been addressed most eloquently in a blog in The Chronicle by Jason Lane and Kevin Kisner, who noted that an attempt to define foreign educational outposts in all their varieties might be close to 'an attempt to hit a moving target'.
Another issue

There is another issue, however, I would like to address. It relates to the second element in the definition: an institution (...) which awards at least one degree in the host country that is accredited in the country of the originating institution.
Following their definition, the authors in the annex include a long list of IBCs and their degrees, and add a list of the accreditation bodies that serves to guarantee the quality of the institutions and degrees quoted. Yet the authors do not define the term 'accreditation' nor do they provide any background information on these bodies. The term 'degree' as such is not made explicit, nor the implication of what an 'accredited degree' entails. The issue is touched on slightly in a section devoted to the 'Law and regulation in host countries' where 'a caveat worth considering (...) is whether a degree programme at an IBC will be formally recognised in the host country for employment or further study'. The observation, however, only addresses the situation in the host countries.
Degrees accredited in the country of the originating institution involve the regulations in the home country in view of employment and further study and it is here that the accreditation and – in consequence – the (national) recognition of the degree is at stake.
Degrees

‘Degrees’ taken in this broad worldwide context require a clear definition, as does accreditation.
A bachelor’s degree obtained in one country may represent something quite different in terms of content ,quality and educational level from a  bachelor’s degree obtained in another, even though de nomenclature is the same. Moreover the possibilities in terms of further education or access to the job market may vary as much. A German trained medical doctor can practice in any other European (Union) country, whereas establishing himself in the US would not be quite so automatic.
The same argument applies to accreditation. Accreditation – originally an American phenomenon – has an established structure in the US where 'recognised' accreditation bodies, to a degree, enjoy a more or less 'guaranteed' status when recognised by the CHEA (Council for Higher Education Accreditation). Their International Directory is used by most established credential evaluation offices in the world as a reference for the status of American accreditation agencies.(All American agencies quoted in the report, by the way, are in the Directory).
Accreditation
In Europe however, accreditation as a quality assurance mechanism carried out by an independent body is a more recent phenomenon. In many European countries – outside the UK - quality assurance in education was for a long time embedded in national legislation. The introduction of accreditation bodies as independent agencies has expanded greatly in recent years, but hardly in a homogenous fashion. In the Netherlands for instance the NVAO – established by the Dutch and Flemish governments-  is a bi-national accreditation body whose approval is required for graduates to obtain national recognised degrees. In other European countries accreditation bodies are independent – sometimes commercial enterprises - sometimes restricted to quality assurance of particular fields or sectors of higher education, and not necessarily under national legislation. Some countries only know accreditation of institutions while in others programme accreditation is the main objective.
In this report accreditation organisations appear to have all been put into one box. A closer look at the degrees cited by the Observatory, raises the question what the status of the material presented here is. A case in point is Dutch Stenden university which has a number of outposts in different parts of the world. Where it appears in the report’s listing, either in the column of host or home institution, a great variety of bodies appear responsible for the accreditation of the diplomas they issue, without this being corroborated. The Ministry of education in Indonesia (DKTI) mentioned for instance, is not an accreditation body, nor is the Dutch ministry, for that matter.
Recognition
The report purports to present an overview of IBC activity, with listings of trustworthy institutions awarding recognised degrees. The (hard?) data presented call for closer scrutiny of whether we are dealing with recognised institutions offering recognised degrees. Apart from that, the award of a degree accredited in the originating country would imply that the degree quoted would give its holder the same rights and opportunities as the holder a national degree obtained at the home institution would have. Much national legislation – in any case in Europe – does not allow the award of a national degree at outposts of their institutions. In practice, this means that graduates of these foreign campuses have no direct access to – for instance - PhD programs or regular professions in the 'home' country, i.e. the country of the originating institution.
Globalisation and final products

The report provides an interesting view of the shifts and new developments that globalisation in higher education is facing. However as long as educational systems provide us with end products – i.e. our diploma's and degrees –and the labour market organises itself on that basis (many remuneration systems are still based upon level of qualifications) , the focus should be on the value of what is obtained at the end of the (educational) track. These 'products' are still, most often, in any case in Europe,  embedded in national regulatory frameworks.
Looking at the issue from an output point of view, it should not really matter in what geographical location the educational programme is provided. Maybe IBCs or educational outposts are in themselves not so important: it is what they ‘produce’ that is. 
It is the quality and the opportunities the final product provides where the focus should be.
This may be as much the case in the host as in the home country.
But preferably: in both.

Posté par pcassuto à 21:47 - - Permalien [#]

28 août 2011

US Higher Education as an Export: It is about the money, but also much more

http://escholarship.org/brand/cshe/institute_logo.gifBy John Douglass, Richard Edelstein and Cecile Hoareau. In a new CSHE research paper, “US Higher Education as an Export,” John Aubrey Douglass, Richard Edelstein, and Cecile Hoaraeu discuss the role of higher education in the US’s portfolio of service sector exports.
The following brief is part of a larger study by the authors on the economic impact of international students and is drawn from a pending proposal to create a California Global Higher Education Hub in the San Francisco/Bay Area. Here, the authors state, “Higher education is the best export, not only because it is profitable and meets labor market and growth needs. Higher education also fulfills a diplomatic and cultural mission like no other form of trade. It diffuses the best of the US’s values across the world, strengthens the US’s image and international position and creates personal relationships which are ever so important in stabilizing the world’s global order.”
The authors argue that, “The US could, and should strategize, to double its enrollment of international students by 2020.” Currently, the US enrolls some 691,000 international students; these students pay tuition and fees estimated to a total of $13 billion dollars during the 2009-10 academic year. Discounting financial aid, and adding the cost of living expenses for students and their families, they estimate that the direct total economic impact of international students is nearly $19 billion a year.”
In his first year of office, and facing the challenge of an economy in severe decline, President Obama identified a key element for future economic growth for the US: we need to “export more of our goods.” The US trade deficit remains a source for other economic maladies, including huge personal and government borrowing to help buy goods and services from abroad that, in turn, has helped to sustain the quality of living for many Americans – or at least until the onset of the Great Recession. The Obama administration set a goal to double the exports of goods and services by 2015 – less than five years.
Is this an achievable goal? The fact is that the nation’s ability to significantly grow the export of non-high tech manufactured goods, or even natural resources, is fairly limited, even if the dollar declines in its value as many predict if US borrowing continues unabated. America’s most significant growth potential is probably in the service sector. This includes financial services, patent royalties and licensing fees, management and consulting, entertainment, telecommunications, and education.
Among the top service sectors in which the US had a trade surplus in 2008, education ranks sixth - more important than entertainment (Film, TV, Sports and the Arts), advertising and even communications.). Most of the “import” costs relate to US students going abroad for education programs.
“Higher education is the best export, not only because of it is profitable and meets labor market and growth needs,” they state. “Higher education also fulfills a diplomatic and cultural mission like no other form of trade. It diffuses the best of the US’s values across the world, strengthens the US’s image and international position and creates personal relationships which are ever so important in stabilizing the world’s global order.”
Download US Higher Education as an Export: It is about the money, but also much more.

Posté par pcassuto à 00:50 - - Permalien [#]
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