Defining social responsibility: a matter of urgency for philosophy and universities

In this article, François Vallaeys, a philosopher specialising in university social responsibility and adviser to the Regional Observatory on Social Responsibility in Latin America and the Caribbean, reflects on the concept of social responsibility and its application in the university context.
1. Lack of theoretical definition: how can a responsibility be social?
The corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement has developed strongly in recent decades. Quality standards now integrate the social and environmental aspects of production and management processes: there is no longer “quality” without “responsibility”. In this context, universities have also become the focus of attention in recent years. We talk about the sustainable and/or responsible campus, publish institutional reports on university social responsibility (USR), and endeavour to relate academic training and research to social participation that supports a more humane, inclusive and sustainable form of development.
However, the meaning and scope of CSR as a concept have not been explored in any real depth. The resulting ambiguity generates endless confusion and misunderstandings, and gives rise to debate about the aptness of the concept and its unrealistic nature. Could CSR be no more than a rehash of good old corporate philanthropy, intended perhaps to soften the disastrous impact of unregulated global capitalism? Or is it really a new way of rationally managing the economy in the global era of the “risk society” (Beck, 1986)? Should we view this responsibility as an optional commitment undertaken voluntarily, or take steps to make it compulsory? In the academic context, is social responsibility a new model for administrative and academic management or just a new label for the kind of solidarity outreach projects many universities have pursued for years?
We are faced with a multitude of practices, but lack a clear theoretical framework. What does it really mean to be “socially responsible”? Where is the theory of social responsibility (SR) we can refer to? How can “responsibility”—which legally and morally speaking concerns autonomous individuals who can be held accountable for their actions—become something “social”, a responsibility of all and for all? Are we to ask society as a whole to be responsible? Society is not a subject! Or will individuals have to take on the burden of their entire society? They are part of society; they are immersed in it and have no power over it! A social responsibility would be so broad, it is impossible to see how it could ever be applied in practice. It could not possibly serve as a sound basis for compelling citizens and organisations to act in a certain way. At best, it would be little more than an invitation to sign up to a “commitment of solidarity” in tackling social issues (poverty, discrimination, pollution, etc), rather than a “responsibility” as such. In fact, this is the way people spontaneously view SR, despite claims that it is not philanthropy. None of these philosophical questions have been answered, and this has practical implications: ISO 26000, the social responsibility standard, does not provide for rigorous certification of clearly defined practices. Rather, it is the result of a process of negotiation, conducted over many years and involving 90 countries and all relevant social actors. Organisational social responsibility is still a fuzzy concept that anyone can lay claim to. And because we have no clear idea what responsibility we are talking about, it remains no more than a voluntary commitment that no one can challenge by invoking a clearly defined obligation. So we need to do a bit of philosophy to better understand what we are dealing with. “There is nothing more practical than a good theory,” as Kurt Lewin (1952) said. Read more...